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In the Supreme C.ourl of the Stale of Utah
.JUNE SINGLETON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.GEORGE V. ALEXANDER and
\VILLIAM J. GREEN, a copartnership,
d/h/a CAREFREE LAUNDRY,

Case No.
10780

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a personal injury action arising out of
plaintiff-appellant's slipping and falling in water from
an overflowing public toilet in defendant-respondents'
self-servicP laundromat.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court granted defendant-respondents'
mot ion for summary judgment and costs.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondents pray that the judgment be
affirmed and that they be awarded their costs on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants cannot agree with plaintiff's statement
of facts and her brief fails to properly cite the record
herein. Therefore, defendants will restate the facts.
Deposition citations below refer to plaintiff's own testimony.
Plaintiff, as a business invitee, entered defendants'
self-service laundry, knowing it was a self-service
laundry ( Depo., p. 5, 1. 8). No employee was present
while plaintiff was in the premises but employees are
customarily not present in self-service laundries and
customers run the coin-operated machines themselves.
(Depo., p. 6, 1. 10; R-8, para 4). Defendants' empioyeP,
Wilma G. Alexander, inspected the premises ·within onehalf to one hour before plaintiff was injured and specifically inspected the floor and public toilet, finding all in
order. She left and went home (R-8, para. 7). Plaintiff
was on defendants' premises for approximately one-half
hour (Depo., p. 11, 1. 22). Other custornf'rs entered while
she was there (Depo., p. 18). When she entered, she saw
a small spot of water approximately one foot in diameter
in one corner (Depo., p. 13, 1. 5). \Yilma Alexander's
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telephone number was posted in a conspicuous place on
the premises with notice to telephone her in the event of
an emergency, but no one advised her of any defect in
the premises and she did not learn of the water on the
premises until after plaintiff fell on leaving the premises
(R-8, para. 6-7). While plaintiff was on the premises,
some unknown customer or member of the public, but
not an employee, put too much toilet paper in the public
toilet and it overflowed (R-8., para. 8), leaving water
one-fourth to one-half inch deep around the exit from
the premises (Depo., p. 14, 1. 30). Plaintiff started to
walk out of the premises following her daughter, carrying a large laundry basket (Depo., p. 17-18). Because
of the basket she could not see the floor as she walked,
could not see her feet at all (Depo., p. 16, 1. 18), could
not see where she was walking, and was not making any
particular effort to look to see where she was walking,
but was looking straight ahead (Depo., p. 22). She did
not see the water that had overflowed from the toilet,
took three stPps into it, (Depo., p. 17, 1. 21) felt the
water through her shoes (Depo., p. 20, 1. 4), said "be
careful" to her daughter and slipped and fell in the
water (Depo., p. 16, 1. 24), causing her injury. ·when
plaintiff fell, "Wilma G. Alexander was called on the
telephone. She cairn~ immediately to the premises, inspected, and found that the water on the floor was
ennsed by an excessive amount of toilet paper clogging
tlw toilet which caused it to overflow (R-8, para. 7-8).
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Plaintiff testified she did not know how the water
got there (Depo., p. 15, 1. 6), how long it had been there
(Depo., p. 20, 1. 1), or whether any of defendants or
their employees knew of it (Depo., p. 22, 1. 26). Plaintiff
was given opportunity to produce additional facts when
her deposition was taken but did not do so (Depo., p. 48,
1. 13-18).
As the sole basis for negligence, plaintiff's amended
complaint, paragraph 4, alleges:
" ... Defendants and each of them, nPgligently
and carelessly and ·without due regard for the
safety of their patrons, and the public permitted
a. slippery and foreign substance to be present
on the floor of defendants' Laundromat, .... "
(R-4) (Emphasis added).

Based upon that sole allegation of negligence in the
complaint, plaintiff's deposition, the Alexander affidavit
(R-8) and plaintiff's notice of readiness for trial (R-7),
defendants moved for summary judgment (R-9).
Plaintiff filed no responsive affidavits. The motion
was published and the case taken under advisement to
permit the filing of briefs, although def Pndants had already filed their brief (R-10). Not until Septembe>r 27,
15 days after hearing of the motion, did plaintiff filP an
affidavit stating only "thPre is

110

drain facility in the

public bathroom located on the pn'rnises.''

The Trial Court granted defendants' motion for
smmnary judgment and mrnrded defendants judgment
in their favor and costs (R-14). Plaintiff appealed.
Incidentally, plaintiff's brief in its statement of facts,
page 3, claims Mrs. Alexander contradicted herself, saying she said in her affidavit the premises had a telephone
with her number listed on a card near it, but in her
answers to interrogatories she admitted there was no
telephone on the premises. Plaintiff is wholly inaccurate.
Tlw Alexander affidavit (R-S, para. 6) says:
"On the coin dwngcrs located in a conspicuous place on tht' premises appears a sign which
givt>s either depondent's telephone number or
1\Trs. Greer's tPlephone number .... On November
14, 1963, affiant 's name and telephone number
were so posted."

ARGUMENT
POINT I. RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE.

62 ALR 2d 57, sa:rn :

"It is univrrsnll.11 hdd that the res ipsa
loqnitur doctri1w is i11applicable to ~u~ts .against
bnsin<'SS proprietors to recover for mJunes sustaim'd in falls on floors within the business premisl'S which are allt>ged to have been rendered
slipiwry hy the 1n·psence .thereon of water, or
rnnd, snow, t>tc." (Emphasis added)

6
61 ALR 2d 58 says exactly the same thing with
regard to litter and debris. Thirty cases from ten jurisdictions are cited bv
. the two annotations .
The res ipsa elements which must be present are:
"(1) 'That the accident was a kind which, in
the ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had due care been observed; (2) that
it happened irrespective of any participation by
the plaintiff; and (3) that the cause thereof was
something under the management or control of
the defendant, or for which it is responsible."
Wightmarn v. Mt. Fuel Supply Co., 5 Ut. 2d 373,
302 P.2d 471.

The doctrine is not applicable here. First, plaintiff has
not shown toilets overflow without any negligence. Second, plaintiff did participate, for she walked in the
water. Third, plaintiff has not shown the toilet was
exclusively in defendants' control; it was instead a public
toilet, used and operated by the public. Finally, df'fendants have explained and rebutted any possible inference of negligence by showing that the water came from
an overflowing toilet overstuffed by someone other than
defendants or their employees.
In Barnhill v. Young Electric Sign Co., 13 Ut.2d 347,
37 4 P.2d 311, plaintiff claimed rrs ipsa, but this Court
said:
"Where it is clear that it is at least equally
probable that the negligence was that of anoth<•I',
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the court must instruct the jury that the plaintiff
has not proved his case. The injury must be
traced to a specific instrumentality or cause for
which defendant was responsible."

W clch v. Sears Roebuck Co., (Cal. 1950) 215 P.2d
796, stresst>d at page 4 of plaintiff's brief, is scarcely in
point. There a roll of linoleum fell on plaintiff after
defendant's clerk had unrolled it, snapped it back into the
roll, and left to answer the telephone. That is a classical
res ipsa situation, for things normally don't usually fall
without negligence by persons in control. Here it was
plaintiff who fell, so if res ipsa applies at all, it is to
plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Knowles v. Hillside Lounge, Inc., 137 N.vV.2d 361,
and Bell ·u. Koch, Inc. i·s. Stanley, 375 s.·W.2d 696, cited
hy plaintiff's hrirf, page 7, are distinguishable because
1l1<>y involw a collapsing chair and a falling stack of
dry-wall shePts, respectively. Chairs don't usually break
and things don't usually fall without negligence by persom; in control. Public toilets do overflow without neglif','<'nce

h~'

tlH' lando-wner.

Rarca v. Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc., 256 N.Y.S.2d
I+, cited at page 7, is not a decision of the highest court
of N<'W York, and while its dicta takes a view of the
n,p1)licahility of res ipsa to supermarkets which is contrary to that tak<'n by any other court, the case is actually

d(•<·i<l<>d on other grounds. 'l1 he case s:\YS:
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" ... aside from any question of res ipsa, the
proof of the condition of the spilled sugar numerous foot tracks through it, etc. - presented
a question of fact on the issue of constructive
notice and was not an absence of notice as a
matter of law case, as the trial court indicated."

Sanone v. J. C. Penney Co., 17 Ut.2d 4fi, 404 P.2d
248, cited at page 7, is not in point. '11here plaintiff
caught her foot in an escalator while halfway down it.
The Court held n•s ipsa applied, saying:
"Nor does it depart from reason to draw the
inference that if an escalator is so used (in the
manner intended) and that an injury occurs there
was something wrong either in the construction,
maintenance, or operation of the escalator. . . .
Inasmuch as the escalator was under the exclusiw
control of the defendant, the test for the application of the doctrine is fulfilled."
Had plaintiff there slipped on \rnter on thP escalator,
rPs ipsa would not havP appliPd.
Thus, it is cfoar rPs ipsa is not applicable against
landownPrs in the case of toilets OJH-'l'<Lted and usPd by
the public, hPcause the public may causP thPm to overflow.
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT.

The discovPr.v tools and affidavits prn]H'rly before
the Court clParly show that defrnd~mtc: n·nso11alily <'xer-
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cised their duty of inspection and had no notice of the
existence of the 'vater on ·which plaintiff fell. They
show the condition was created by someone other than
defendants or their employees. They show that plaintiff
has no knowledge of and cannot show how the water
got on the floor, by ·whom it was deposited, how it arrived
there or that defendants had knowledge of its presence.
Since plaintiff testified she was in the premises for
about one-half hour and that the condition did not exist
when she entered, the record affirmatively shows that
the condition existed for something less than one-half
hour. Absent evidence to the contrary, the condition
could have been created only seconds before plaintiff
foll and speculation as to "'hen it was created is prohihik<l.
In Lhz,dsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Ut.2d 364, 284
P.2d 477 ( 1955), plaintiff, after dining in defendant's
coffpe shop, sli.pped on a small quantity of water which
somehow got on the floor some time after she was seated.
'l111is Court affim1ed a directed verdict for defendant in
the absence of evidence "as to how the water got onto
the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when it
arrived there, or that defendant had knowledge of its
presence.''
Erickson v. Walgreen Drng Co., 120 U. 31, 232 P.2d
:210 (1951) and De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 5Ut.2d116,
:2!)7 P.2d 898 (1956), distinguish situations of conditions
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created by landowners, where plaintiff need not show
defendant's notice, from situations involving transitory
hazards, as here, when plaintiff must show defendant
knew or should have knmvn of the hazard and had
reasonable opportunity to correct it.
In Hampton v. Roicley, 10 Ut.2d 169, 350 P.2d 161
(1960) plaintiff slipped on a loose stone on the doorstep
of defendant's store. This Court said:
"In regard to a transitory condition of the
character here involved, the instruction given is
consistent with established law that in order to
find the defendants negligent, it must be shown
that they either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of any hazardous
condition and had a rPasonable opportunity to
remedy the same.''
In 61 A.L.R 2d 125-6, the annotator says:
"In contrast with the rule applicable to a
floor condition resulting from the act of the proprietor or his employees, it is ht•ld that \Ylier<'
it appears that a floor in a store or similar placP
of business has been made dangerous by the presence thereon of an ohstacle and the presenee of
the obstacle is tracPable to iwrsons for whom the
proprietor is not responsihlP, proof that thP proprietor was negligent in relation to tlw floor
condition requires a showing that he had actual
noticP thereof or that the eondition PxistPd for
such a 10ngtl; of time that in tlH• <'X!'reis<' of
rPasonahle car<' hP shoulcl han· known of it."
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In J. C. Penney, Inc. v. Kellermeyer (Ind. 1939)
1!) N.E.2d 882, 22 N.E.2d 899, plaintiff claimed defendant
was negligent in maintaining a foreign object on the
floor of its store. A verdict for the plaintiff was reversed as a matter of law on the ground that there was
no evidence that the object was on the floor for any
length of time whatever or that defendant or its servants
knew it was on the floor, or, because of the length of
time it was there, in the exercise of reasonable care,
dl'fendants should have known about it.
In Robinson v. Grcnt Atlantic and Paci[ ic Tea Co.
(N.C. 19-1-1), 1-17 S.\V.2d 648, a verdict for plaintiff was
reversed as a matter of law when it appeared that a box
over which plaintiff tripped in defendant's grocery store
"'as not in the passageway when plaintiff entered the
stor<> some 10 to 15 minutes before she fell, the court
saying that the box was not in the passageway for suffieit>nt length of time to charge defendant with constructive
notice of the obstruction.
Jn Gargaro 1·. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co.
(Tenn. 193S) 118 S.\V.2d 561, it was held the trial court
did not err in dismissing plaintiff's suit, saying that
proof that tlw basket owr which plaintiff tripped had
n•rnaint>d in the aisle of the store from 20 to 30 minutes
prior to plaintiff's accident "·as not sufficient to charge
1ld'Pndant with notice that the baskt>t was in the aisle so
1liat defrndant 's failnrt> to remove it could be considered
11vgl igencP.
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Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel, J. C. Penney v. Kellermeyer, Robinson v. Great Atlarntic and Pacific Te.a, Co.
and Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery, supra, all hotel, department store or supermarket cases, as opposed to this
self-service laundry, hold that absence of evidence as
to how long the transitory condition existed, or evidence
that it existed for 15 minutes, or 30 minutes, will not
charge defendant with failure to discover within a
reasonable time as a m.atter of law.
Here involved is a self-service laundry where employees are not customarily present. The overflowing
water could not have existed for longer than one-half
hour. Plaintiff cannot show it existed even that long;
it might have been only seconds. There can be no question that, as a matter of law as established by the foregoing cases, defendant did not unreasonably fail to discover the water.
Plaintiff's brief, page 10, claims plaintiff's deposition at page 15 presents evidence that the water came
from the plumbing beneath the toilet instead of from
overflow. Not only is this gross conjecture; it is incompetent hearsay. The deposition, page 15, reflects that
plaintiff didn't know where the water came from, that
some unidentified person told her it came from the bottom of the toilet and plaintiff and her counsel said:
"A. That's hearsay.
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MR. HUGGINS: That's right."
Such is hardly a showing "made on personal knowledge"
of "facts as would be admissible in evidence" by an
affiant "competent to testify" thereto as required by
Rule 56 ( e), U.R.C.P. If plaintiff really wanted to claim
water came from below the toilet, she should have presented a counter-affidavit in proper form to rebutt the
Alexander affidavit that after learning of the accident
and the water on the floor, "Affiant then inspected the
premises and found that the toilet had overflowed because an excessive amount of toilet paper had plugged
up the bowl."
Plaintiff's brief makes no effort to distinguish the
applicable Utah cases, although they were cited in defendants' memorandum to the Trial Coµrt (R-60). The
cases from other jurisdictions cited by plaintiff, while
not controlling, are all distinguishable.
Plaintiff's brief, page 10, cites Newman v. United
States, 248 Fed. Supp. 669. It is not in point. It involves
negligent installation by defendant of a water line. As
indicated by the Utah cases cited, supra, when defendant
or its employees actively create the condition complained
of, plaintiff need not show that defendant knew or should
have known of the condition and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy it, for defendant's knowledge is pre:-:nnwd. The summary judgment is here based upon the
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grounds that the water was a transitory condition and
plaintiff cannot show any evidence that defendants
created it, knew of it or had a reasonable opportunity
to remove it. Absent such evidence, summary judgment
is proper. The Newman case does not even reach this
point.

Robinson v. Park Central Apartments, (DDC. 1965)
248 F.Supp.6321, cited at page 10 of plaintiff's brief, is
not in point for there defendants' employees had been
clearing away snow on the approach to the hotel but
stopped, and so defendants were shown to have known
of the condition. Here plaintiff cannot show defendants'
knowledge.
Likewise, in Control Hardware Co. v. Statler, 180 So.
2d 205, page 11, plaintiff's brief, defendant actively created the condition complained of by placing a mat with
a defective edge on the sidewalk and not adequately
lighting it. Since the owner created the condition, plaintiff need not show defendant's knowledge of the condition.

Moore v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 173 So.2d 603,
cited page 11, plaintiff's brief, is not in point. There
plaintiff presented evidence that the janitor improperly
cleaned the supermarket floor and further showed that
defendant employees improperly inspt>cted the floor two
hours before the accident by failing to discover the presence of the drying hanana pe('l. Here, then• is no evi-
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dence of improper inspection and indeed, there is
affirmative evidence showing inspection about one-half
hour before plaintiff fell and slrnwing that the condition
complained of ·was caused by a third party and not by
defendants' employees. Finally, the case at bar involves
a self-service laundromat where (~mployees are customarily not present rather than a supermarket where
employees are constantly present. In any event, Lindsay
r. Rcclrs llotel Co., s11pra, is controlling.

Guidani v. Cwnerlato, (Ill., 1965) 207 N.E.2d 1, cited
i1age 1 l, plaintiff's brief, is distinguishable. There the
Court expressly holds that, because bowlers make a running and sliding approach in bowling, the foreseeable risk
of injury is great, and a bmYling alley proprietor has a
higher duty of inspecting and the reasonable length of
time for discovering defects is shorter than in the common passageway of a retail store. Further, there was
<>vidC'nre in that rase to indicate that the wet floor had
v\:.iskd for more than one hour. In the case at bar it
eannot he determined how long the floor had been wet,
lmt it was less than a half-hour.
Harvey B11ilcli11g, Inc. v. Halley, (Fla. 1965) 175
No.2d 780, ('ited at page 1 l, is distinguishable. There, it
was raining and plaintiff, who slipped on the marble
floor in the office building, offt>red affidavits in opposition to clefrndant's motion for summary judgment stating "the flo01· was of marble construction and was \Yet,
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causing it to be slippery." Summary judgment was there
denied, because defendants' knowledge of the condition
could be implied from knowledge of the rain itself and
that marble becomes particularly slippery when wet.
Here, there is no way constructive kno''Tledge of the
overflowing toilet can be imputed to defendants, particularly when it cannot be shown when the toilet overflowed. The case actually supports defendants, for it
says:
"To defeat a motion (for summary judgment)
which is supported by evidence which reveals no
genuine issue, it is not sufficient for the opposing
party merely to assert that an issue does exist.
(It is a) pretrial motion for a directed verdict."
The court disapproved a lower court's holding that "summary judgment should not be granted if it could be
inferred from the evidence that the plaintiff could prove
at trial that defendant was negligent," and approves
another lower holding taking the opposite view that the
opposing party "must come forward with facts contradicting those submitted by the movant and demonstrating
a real issue between the parties." Here plaintiff has
so failed.

v. El Dorado Bowl, Inc., (Ariz. 1965) 407
P.2d 57, cited page 12, plaintiff's brief, is distinguishabh•
as a bowling alley case, considering the higher duty of
care of bowling alleys owners. See G11ida11i v. Cwncrlatn.
Mu'ff"phy
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suzna. Further, the case involved a construction defect
(a step) for which notice need not be shown rather than
a transitory condition created by a third party.

General Electric v. Salcidio, Ariz. 408 P.2d 42, cited
page 12, plaintiff's brief, is distinguishable solely upon
the quotation from plaintiff's brief that "plaintiff does
uot have to prove actual or constructive notice of defective floor condition, where defect is created by defendant
or his servants."
Ga·rrctt v. American Air Lines, Inc. (C. A. 5th, 1964)
;);)2 F.2d 939, cited page 13, plaintiff's brief, is not
applieahle. The cas<• acknowlf·dges that normally the
earrier has "no liability unless (a) the carrier has put
tlw zipp<•r hag on tlw floor, or (b) the carrier knew it
was on the floor, or ( e) it had been there so long that
tlw carrier was charged with knowledge of its presence
arnl l'onsequent duty to n'move it." The case adds a
fourth basis for finding liability in holding that the
c·arrif'l' must take reasonable cognizance of the habits
and practices g<>nerally followed hy its customers. In
that easl·, the earri<T "acknowledged that passengers
j'INJll<'Jifly put bagµ:age on the floor in front of their
f'PPt." Jlpn•, tlwre is no evidence that patrons might
frer1urntly cause the toild to overflow, and indeed the
Comt ean tnkt> judicial notice that such does not
(1rh·n linpJH'l1.
<·att:-><'

Furth<·r, the case is distinguishable bP-

of tlw highest standard of care attributable to
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carriers rather than the duty of reasonable care attributable to landowners, as here. The case actually supports defendants' motion, for here there is no evidence
that defendants put the water on the floor, knew that it
was on the floor, or that it had been there so long that
defendants werf' chargf'd with knowlf'dgf' of its presPncP.

Deniswich v. Pappas (R.I. 1964) 198 A.2d 144, cited
page 14, plaintiff's brief, is distinguishable. The case
arose when the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the complaint in spite of an allegation that
defendants breached the alleged custom of parking lot
owners to build barriers in the parking lot. The ease
involves an active construction defect by defendant, for
which notice need not be shown. Here, there is no construction defect shown and no evidence that defendants
breached any rustom.
Bozza v. Vornado, Inc. (N.J., 1964) 200 A.2d 7'77,
cited page 14, plaintiff's brief, is not in point and is
contrary to Utah law as stated in Lindsay v. Eccles
Hotel Co., supra. In Bozza, plaintiff fell in litter on a
cafeteria floor, and the Court said:
"When plaintiff has shown that the circumstances were such to create the reasonable probability that the dangerous condition would occur,
he need not also prove actual or constructive
notice of the sp<-'cific condition. Factors bearing
on the existPnce of such rPasonable prohahility
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would inc~~de the nature of the business, the general cond1t10n of the premises, a pattern of conduct or recurring incidents. . . . Once plaintiff
introduces evidence which raises an inference
of negligence, defendant may then negate the inference by submitting evidence of reasonable
rare."
Here there is no evidence of reasonable probability that
the toilet would overflow, or how long the condition
existed, and here defendants did show evidence of reasonable care in inspecting the premises a half-hour before
plaintiff fell. Finally, in considering whether plaintiff
must here prove actual or constructive notice of the
specific condition is to be considered the fact that this
is a self-service laundry where employees are not normally present, as opposed to the cafeteria in Bozza where
they are present.
The same distinction can be made of Mahoney v. J. C.
Pemney Co. (N.M., 1962), 37'7 P.2d 663, cited plaintiff's
brief, page 15. Plaintiff paraphrased the language of
the court and left out the language which hurts her
position. The actual quotation paraphrased is:
"Where the dangerous condition is not an
isolated one, bu.t is foreseeable because of a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, a general
condition, or a continuing condition, then . . .
absent a. showing of due care, plaintiff need not
provf' that defendant had actual or constructive
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knowledge of the specific item forming part of
that paUern of conduct, recurring incident, etc."
(Emphasis added)
Here, there is no slwwing that the overflo\ving toilet
was not isolated, or was foreseeable because of the pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, a general condition,
or a continuing condition. In fact, the showing by defendants is to the contrary. Further, there is an affirmative showing of ins1wction, and henct', duP carp, on imrt
of defendants.
Plaintiff claims a jury might find defendants negligent in leaving the self-service coin-01wratcd laundry unattended. This is not material in absence of showing by
plaintiff as to how long the wakr had bren on the floor,
so as to show that had the premises been attended theoverflow could hav<' heen discoverPd. Further, ~lrs. Alexander did inspect one-half to one hour lwforp she lParned
plaintiff fell (R-8), so lack of an attendant eannot matt<>r.
Speculation as to how long the water existPd is prohibited, for tlw toilPt could have overflowed jnst as
plaintiff left. Since the watf'r wasn't ther<' 1yJwn plaintiff went in and she was there onlv one-half hour, it
could not have he(m th('re long<'r tlian one-half hour.
It is interesting that iilaintiff hersf'lf was attending the
premiRes and slie didn't discovPr th<' water. Plai11tiff
testified other patrons enfored th<' prernist>s alrnnt fiw
minutes hefore she fell (Depo., p. 1S) and plaintiff still
did not learn of tlie wafrr. Tf it lind lH'<'n tliPn' 1011~'.·.
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wouldn't someone have mentioned it~ Hence, the reasonable probability is that the toilet did overflow just as
plaintiff left and therefore the presence of an employee
would have made no difference.
Plaintiff's brief quarrels with the Alexander affidavit that employees are customarily not present in selfservice laundries (R-8), saying the evidence is incompetent. Again, the customary absence of employees in selfservice laundries is a matter of common knowledge of
which the Court can take judicial notice, if the custom is not shown purely by definition of "self-service
laundry". Further, who is more competent to so testify
than one in the self-service laundry business. If plaintiff
disputed the affidavit showing the custom, she should
have filed a counter-affidavit to create an issue of fact.
Ra.msey v. Mellon National Bank (W.D. Pa. 1966),
251 F. Supp. 646 cited by plaintiff's brief, page 9, is
distinguishable on the same ground that court distinguished the prior holding in Y eiarsly v. American Stores
Co. (1929) 97 Pa. Super. 275. In Ramsey there was
conflicting evidence as to the business custom (customary
size of holes in floor mats) but in Year sly, plaintiff failed
to show the grating in which she caught her heel had
unusually large holes and was non-suited. So here, as
in Y parsly, plaintiff failed to show any competent evidence of a custom of having employees present at all
times in self-sf'rvice laundries and thus failed to contra-
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diet defendants' affidavit. Colli,qan v. City of Mo11m1gahela (Pa. 1922) 115 A. 8(i9, cited at 1iage 9 of plaintiff':-:
brief, has nothing at all to do with the issues hert>.
This all comes down to a simplP proposition. In
cases of transitory conditions, imch as water ovPrflowing from toilt~ts, in Utah, a plaintiff is rNJUired to present
evidence, quoting from Lindsay v. f,'ccl<'s Hotel, supra,
"as to how the water got onto thP floor, by whom it was
deposited, exaetly wlwn it arrived thC'r<', or that dPfendant had knowledge of its presenee." Plaintiff testified on depm;ition she did not know tlw ansm•rs to thosP
four questions. On defpndants' motion for srnmnar~
judgment, hPr sworn testimony alone that she did not
know those answ<'rs \\-ould nee<'ssitate hPr prodncing
other affidavih; to answPr the questions to avoid summary judgi1wnt.

~lw

did not pn•sf'nt sneh affidavits.

Instead, defondants WPnt a st(--p further and af'f'innatively showed the watPr ealll(' from a toi](•t eaus<'<l to
overflow by a patron and defendants' ('lllploy(•ps did not
know of its pr<•sPne<>.
In light of that record and th<• controlling l Ttah eases
of Lindsay r. Eccles Hotrl and llm111;to11

11•

Rowle,11.

supra., it is elPar tl1e '!'rial Court did 1wt <'IT in holdi11g
there ,,-as no g<>nnine issup of rnat<'rial faet, tlint as a
matter of hrw defendants \H'l'l' not 1H•µ;lig·('llt ancl in
granting snumuHy judg-rn<·nt.

POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT.

The record affirmatively shows from plaintiff's own
deposition that the water of which she co"mplains was
large, open and obvious. It was a fourth to a half-inch
deep around the exit (Depo., p. 14). Plaintiff's brief
(page 4) calls it an "extensive inundation." As plaintiff
walked, she carried a basket which she knew prevented
her from seeing her feet or the floor (Depo., p. 16). She
had seen some water on the floor when she entered
( Depo., p. 13). Even though she had seen that water
and even though knew she could not see her feet or the
floor, she testified she looked straight ahead and made
no particular effort to see where she was walking (Depo.,
p. 22). Although plaintiff's brief argues plaintiff had
no notice of the water and is therefore excused, to the
contrary, she testified she took three steps into the
water, and then told her daughter "be careful." Therefore she was then aware of the hazard and having thus
acquired notice of the condition she slipped and fell.
Hence, she was contributorily negligence as a matter
of law, first in not watching where she was walking
when she knew she could not see the floor, second, in
entering the clearly visible large area of water, and
third, in not using reasonable care to avoid falling after
she was aware of the hazard.
In Whitmarn v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Ut.2d 81, 395
I' .2d 918 ( 1964), the granting of summary judgment on
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the ground of contributory negligence was sustained
when a deliveryman (an invitee, Restatement of Torts
2d §332), in returning to his truck, opened the first door
he saw and stepped off backwards into an elevator shaft
without taking a precautionary glance beyond the door.
This Court said :
"The plaintiff is confronted with the basic
proposition that where there is a hazard which
is plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged with
the duty of seeing and avoiding it. And if he fails
to do so, it is concluded that he was negligent
either in failing to look, or in failing to heed
what he saw.... In order to justify holding that
a jury question as to negligence exists, where
injury has resulted from an observa,ble hazard,
it is essential that there be something which could
be regarded as tending to distract the plaintiff's
attention or to prevent him from seeing the
danger, thus providing some reasonable basis for
a finding that even though he exercised due care,
he could be excused from seeing and avoiding it.
Here, there is no evidence by plaintiff of any distraction. Plaintiff cannot say the basket prevented her
from seeing the hazard, for she knew that she could not
see the floor but made no effort to see around the basket.
Further, carrying the basket was her own a.ct; it cannot
be said that defendants or any outside agency prevented
her from seeing.

In Moore v. Kroger Co., (Ga. 1953) 74 SE.2d 481,
plaintiff tripped over a push cart in the aisle in defendant's self-service grocery store, her vision having been
obscured by a large sack of groceries which she was
carrying in her arms. A general demurrer to the petition was sustained, the court holding that the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries was her failure to exercise
ordinary care for her own safety in looking ahead in
the direction in which she was walking.
Plaintiff's brief, page 16, argues that defendants
knew or should have known the customers will carry
baskets and that it is foreseeable that a customer will
not see temporary hazards in his way. It certainly isn't
foreseeable that customers will not make any effort to
see around their baskets to observe clearly visible hazards. If the risk is foreseeable for defendants, it is
equally foreseeable for plaintiff. The record is clear
that plaintiff, notwithstanding foreseeability, was not
making any effort to look to see where she was walking
though she knew she could not see where she was walking or see the floor (Depo., page 22). Such evidence does
not make a question for the jury as a matter of law.
Thus, plaintiff is in exactly the same position as was
plaintiff in Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., and in Moore
v. Kroger Co., supra, both of which held plaintiff was
negligent as a matter of law.
Plaintiff makes no effort to distinguish the controlling Whitman case. The cases cited by plaintiff,
while not controlling, are all distinguishable.
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Plaintiff's brief, page 16, cites Kreiss v. Altima
Laundry, Inc., (Ga., 1963), 133 So.2d 602. The case is
not in point, for the issue there was whether plaintiff
selected the proper route. Here defendants do not claim
plaintiff used an improper route, but that she failed to
look where she was walking.

Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Stephens (D.C., 1964), 197
A.2d 849, cited at page 16, is distinguishable from this
case on the same grounds that the court there distinguished its prior holding in Safeu·ny Stores, Inc. v. Fenney (1960) 163 A.2d 624. In Stephens, plaintiff testifi<>d
she was proceeding in a careful manner, although hurriedly, whereas in Fenney, plaintiff encountered the
danger "automatically and in an absent-minded and forgetful manner." Here, plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, as in Fenney, in failing to observe a plainly visible hazard. There is no evidence hPre
that plaintiff was proceeding carefully, as in Stephens;
the evidence here is that she could not see the floor or
where she was walking and was not making any particular effort to see, as in Fenney.
Dever v. Theriot's, Inc. (iLa., 1964 ), 159 So.2d 602,
is improperly paraphrased in plaintiff's favor at page
17 of her brief. The omissions from the sentence show
the distinction. The actual quotation varaphrased is that
plaintiff, who frll in a supermarket, was not guilty of
contributory negligent "in failing to obserw inconspicuous particles or substanees in the ais]C'," and it 1vas not

necessary to make "a specific observation of floor conditions before taking each step, especially in view of
the storekeeper's presumed intention and knowledge that
the customer will devote the major portion of his .aittention to inspecting the merchandise deliberately displayed
to attract it." Here, the hazard was not inconspicuous,
and this was an accident in a self-service laundromat,
where the record is devoid of evidence of displays or
any other distractions.
Plaintiff's brief, page 17, cites Garofoli v. Salesianum School, Inc., (Del. 1965) 208 A.2d 308. The case
is distinguishable on the same grounds that the Court
distinguished its prior holding in Freileck v. H omeopathic Hospital Association, 150 A.2d 17. In Garofoli
there was evidence that plaintiff was proceeding carefully, and hence a jury question existed. In Freileck,
plaintiff was held negligent as a matter of law in falling
over a chain on a foggy night where "there was nothing
to indicate that plaintiff had been watching carefully
where she was going.'' Here, the only evidence affirmatively slwws that plaintiff was not watching carefully
where she was going, so Fre1"leck, not Garofoli, applies.
Further, in Garof oli, there was evidence of poor lighting
not here present.
Plaintiff's brief, page 17, cites Robinson v. Park
Central Apartments, (D.C. 1965) 248 F.Supp. 632. There

a:,; plaintiff stepped from a taxi, he slipped on ice cover-
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ing the sidewalk left after defendant cleared snow. The
United States District Court, a single judge, said ''I do
not believe he was under any duty to look down on the
street before he got out of the taxicab and ascertain
the exact state of the street. It looked clear because
there was no snow piled on it." (Emphasis added) The
case is distinguishable because there plaintiff looked but
could not see the hazard and was held not bound to
ascertain the exact state of the hazard, but here plaintiff
did not look at all to see what was clearly visible' and
though she knew she could not see the floor, she stepped
fon,·ard any-v.·ay.
Plaintiff's brief, page 18, cites Blacldmrn 'V. Toml1ling, (Colo., 1965) 407 P.2d 337. That cast' is distinguishable because there plaintiff's view of the step between
the hotel door and street level was obstructed hy tlw
door and the lighting. The court said, "one fully exercising due care could fail to observe the difference·
hetween the hotel and strPd levPls." In Blacklnm1,
plaintiff was prevented from seeing by conditions created by defendant, that is, the door and the poor light.
Here the hazard was larg(~ and clearly visible; nothing
but plaintiff's own basket prevented her from seemg,
and plaintiff here did not exercise due care.
The recalling of the Court's attention to TVhitman
v. lV. T. Gr:rmt Co., supra, a Utah 19G4 case, whiclt
plaintiff has not attPmpted to distinguish, and tlw pn~
ceding distinctions of defendants' c<1~'<'S an' sufficient
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answer to plaintiff's brief, page 18, that "the cases cited
by defendants in support of their contributory negligence
allegation are, as is obvious, old cases, not in point, and
at the present time not good law."
Clearly, plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law
and the Trial Court did not err in so ruling.
POINT IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The sole ground of negligence alleged in the amend(•d complaint is that "defendants . . . negligent and

carPlessly . . . permitted a slippery and foreign substance to be present on the floor of defendants' laundro~
mat. ... '' ( R-4, para 4). Plaintiff filed notice of readiness for trial and her counsel certified therein he had
interviPwPd all known witnesses he might call on trial,
that all use> of rules of discovery as necessary had been
compl<'tPd, that he was ready for trial and that he "rf>quests thP court to act in reliance thereon."
At that voint, the verified discovery tools before
tlw Court showed that plaintiff claimed the slippery
suht;hmeP on the floor was water in great quantity
(Df'po., p. 9), that she didn't know how it go there, how
Ionµ; it had hPen tlwre or whether any of defendants'
Prnplo>·N·s kiww of it ( Dt>po., p. 15, 20, 22). The water
"asn't tlwn• when plaintiff went in and she was there
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only one-half hour ( Depo., p. 11). Defendants' affidavit
sho\\·ed they inspected the premises one-half to one hour
before plaintiff was injured and all ~was in order, that
no employee was present while plaintiff was present,
that no employee kne>v of the wat<'r and that the water
came from a toilet whieh overflowed bf'cause a customer
put too much papPr in the toilet (R-8). The record
affirmatively shmn'd the water was not caused by defendants but by a nwmber of the pnhlic, that dPfendants
did not know of it, that it was transitory eondition and
that defendants did not unreasonably fail to discovPr it.
All this showed plaintiff could not provr• "defendants ... negligently ... 1wrmittt>d a slippery and foreign
subs tanee to be present on the floor," as alk•gecl and
affirmativ<'ly showed <lefendants wPn' not negligent and
plaintiff was.
Based on that reeord and plaintiff's notic<-> of l'Ptu1in<->ss for trial, def<'ndants moved for sn1111nary judgment.
Plaintiff filed no rounl<'r-affidavits 11d01·<~ hearing of
the motion but fifteen clays aftPr ]waring sPned aml
filed an affidavit that there was no drain facility in
defendants' bath mom. 'l'hough plaintiff's amended complaint alleged only that dl'fenclants nPglig<•ntl~- 1wn11itted
a foreign su1Jstanc<~ io <>~ist a1Hl t11011gli plaintiff :-;uhmittE'd the motion to th<· Trial Court 011 tliat t!iPnry,
plaintiff now arµ;ne:..; in Ji Pr h1·i(•f,

pi,';(· :; :
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" ... nor has defendant introduced any information that the \Yater on the floor was being
properly eliminated by the drain installed on
defendants' premises."
Thus plaintiff, on appeal, attempts on the basis of
her untimely affidavit to shift her theory from negligrnce in permitting water on the floor to exist to negligmce in installing and maintaining the plumbing, and
says the Court erred in granting summary judgment.
Plaintiff's argument fails in a number of respects.
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., requires that opposing affidavits he served prior to the day of hearing of motions
for summary judgment. Plaintiff's affidavit was 15 days
late, and plaintiff failed to obtain leave to file it. The
affidavit thus should not be considered by the Court. See
Surkin v. Clwrteris (C.A. 5th, 1952), 197 F.2d 77.
Tlw mere fact of no drain in the bathroom does not,
of itself, constitute negligence, for there is no evidence
that the standard of care requires such. "The whole
purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if a
easP could be forced to trial by a mere assertion that
an issue exists." LeiningPr v. Sterns-Roger 111/g. Co.
(19G5) 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33. Scapecchi v. Harold's
('l11l; (Nev., 1962) 371P.2d815, 818, holds:
" ... it was not shown what caused (persons)
to :-olip and no evidence was presented to show
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that a terrazzo surface is inherently slippery
when wet. The mere unverified allegations regarding the characteristics of a terrazzo surface
did not present factual issues which would preclude a summary judgment."
Plaintiff must present some evidentiary material to contradict defendants case or specify in an affidavit why
she cannot do so. Dupler v. Yates (1960) 10 Utah 2d 251~
351 P.2d 624, specifically says :
"Where, as in the instant case, the materials
presented by the moving party are sufficient to
entitle him to a directed verdict and the opposing
party fails either to offer counter-affidavits or
materials that raise a credible issue or to shmv
that he has evidence not then available, summary
judgment may be rendered for the moving
party."

In Heathman v. Fabian d!: Clendenin, 1-1- Ut.2d 60,
377 P.2d 189, (1962), the granting of summary judgment in a fraud case was sustained, the Court saying:
''The evidence clearly shows that the trial
judge carefully gave Heathman every opportunity to show that he had been mistreated, or that
there had been fraud or undue influence asserted
in the Hatch case."
Here, plaintiff might as well have said in her affidavit the laundromat had no fireplael' or that the floor
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was asphalt tile. Neither statement, by itself, creates an
issue of fact as to negligence; neither does the lack of
a floor drain in the bathroom. Indeed, the Court can
take judicial notice that seldom do bathrooms have floor
drains, as that is a matter of common knowledge. Little
Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Ut. 2-±3, 267, 289
P. 116. The lack of a floor drain cannot be causative,
for plaintiff would still have fallen in water running to it.
Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., as amended, effective October
1, 1965, providPs:
"~When a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this rule,
and adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or dPnials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does
not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entPred against him.'' (Emphasis
added)

LindlJcrg t'. Backman (1959) 9 Ut.2d 58, 337 P.2d
-1-33, upon ~which plaintiff relies, page 19, was decided
lwfore Rule 56 ( e) was amended to provide as above.
1'he rule now requires that plaintiff, facing defendant's
affidavit (R-8) and her own deposition, furnish by affidavit or other verified discovery tools evidence that the
laek of an OV('rflow drain in the bathroom constitutes
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negligence, or that there was something wrong with the
toilet or existing drain. She may not rely on her complaint.
The moving party on summary judgment is not
required to negative every possible matter of defense.
Best v. Bu.rch (Cal., 1955) 283 P .2d 262. Plaintiff submitted the case on the theory that defendants negligently
permitted the water to be present and submitted no
affidavits or other materials to show that there was
anything wrong with the plumbing. No issue has ever
been raised on that point. Plaintiff then argues on
appeal that because there was no floor drain in the
bathroom there could have been something wrong with
the r-plumbing itself. Mere assertions or conjecture by
plaintiff's counsel do not suffice.

Dupler v. Ya,tes,

Leininger v. Sterns-Rogers Mfg. Co., supra.
Plaintiff's brief, page 19, says "nothing has been
adduced or offered by defendants to indicate plaintiff
could not sustain her burden of proof." On the contrary, plaintiff testified she did not know how the water
got there, where it came from, who put it there or how
long it had been there. That shows plaintiff cannot
sustain her burden of proof, and on motion for summary
judgment, she must then come forward with affidavits
or other discovery tools showing a genuine issue of fact.
She failed and the summary judgment

i~

proper.
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Plaintiff's brief, page 19, says "Questions of fact
remain unanswered. What caused the hazard~" Facing
defendants' affidavit of the cause, it is plaintiff who
must answer that question to create an issue of fact,
and failing to so do, summary judgment is proper.
Plaintiff's brief, page 19, says "nothing indicates
those questions, and others, could not be reasonably
answered in plaintiff's favor at trial, and the record
indiciates the availability of evidence which supports
plaintiff's allegations." The record is in fact devoid of
anything save counsel's conjecture. Plaintiff's brief,
page 20, complains plaintiff was prevented from crossexamining. On the contrary, plaintiff did submit interrogatories (R-3) and plaintiff certified in notice of
readiness for trial that all discovery had been completed
(R-'7). Plaintiff's argument flies in the face of Utah
eases cited, supra, and 35B C.J.S., Fed. Civ. Pr., §1198,
]). Gl7 :

"An affidavit of the party opposing summary
judgment which merely suggests that a trial on
the merits might develop facts from which the
court might reach a particular conclusion does
not raise a genuine issue of fact or indicate the
existence of a substantial controversy; and assertion by a party in his affidavits that at the trial
he might produce further evidence does not preclude granting of summary judgment on motion
of the other party.
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"Defendant cannot successfully oppose plaintiff's motion for summary judgment by asserting
by his attorney's affidavit his right and need for
cross-examination of plaintiff's ·witnesses on trial
and credibility tests of witnesses of plaintiff on
trial to develop his evidence to defeat plaintiff's
complaint under the issues of the case, in the
absence of showing that defendant had made a
good faith earnest effort to present competent
evidence of the fact, depositions, and exhibits in
his possession or available to him by appropriate
procedure and discovery action or reasonable
investigation. The failure of plaintiff, against
whom summary judgment was entered, to makr
use of discovery procedure was destructive of hi&
contention that he had not a sufficient opportunity to test the veracity of facts stated in thP
supporting affidavits.''
Plaintiff's brief, page 20, suggests two inconsistencies in the Alexander affidavit, hut plaintiff is dead
wrong on both. First, as pn~viously explained, the
Alexander affidavit does not say there is a phone on
the premises, it says her phone number was posted on
a coin changer. Second, the mere reading of paragraphs
7 and 8 of the AlexandPr affidavit (R-8) shows that on
learning of the water on the floor, affiant "inspected
the premises and found the toilet had overflowed." That
clearly shows the ·water ::wurce. If plaintiff claims any
other source, where is her affidavit sup1rnrting the claim?

It seems that the Pntire reason for this aprwal 1:revealed on page 20 of plaintiff's hrit>f, \rhich sRys:
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"The mere fact that an affiant states that
she did examine the premises within thirty minutes prior to the accident, and that they were
perfectly normal, and that some unknown person
came in and stuffed the toilet is not sufficient
Pvidence to disprove any allegation of negligence
or to prevent plaintiff from cross-examining as
to whether or not the facts stated in the affidavit
were in fact true."
Defendants submit that Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., Lindsay v.
Eccles Hotel, and Hampton v. Rowley, supra, show plaintiff is wrong and that summary judgment is here proper.
Clearly, there is no basis on which summary judgment can now be granted to plaintiff, for every case
cited by plaintiff, even though distinguishable, says
only that a jury question exists as to negligence and
contributory negligence.
CONCLUSION
Apparently plaintiff agrees that the specific facts
presented by affidavit and deposition merit the conclusion that defendants were not negligent and that plaintiff was, for page 21 of plaintiff's brief says:
"The law governing Summary Judgment cannot be that a party may by affidavit, swear that
he was not negligent, and by affidavit state that
the opposing party \\'as neglige~t, .and l~ave th,~
Court accept this as competent, bmdmg evidence.
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Defendants did not swear they "were not negligent" or
that plaintiff "was negligent." Their affidavit merely
recites the facts and plaintiff makes her own conclusion
above quoted. D1:'fendants agree with plaintiff's conclusion.
The verified discovery materials and affidavits before the Court not only show plaintiff cannot meet her
burden of proving defendants were negligent, they also
affirmatively show no negligence on the part of the
defendants, and negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff has testified she does not know how long the
condition she complains of existed or how it was crl'ated.
rrhere is no evidence that defendants failed within a
reasonable time to discover tlw transitory condition created by third parties. Plaintiff testified she was not making any particular effort to see where she was walking,
although she knew she could not see her feet and thr
floor and as a result she failed to see and ·walked right
into a large and obvious transitory condition. Plaintiff
has not even attempted distinetions of the controlling
Utah cases. Every single case cikd by plaintiff, all
from other jurisdictions, is disting11ishable.

Plaintiff

has failed to set forth specific facts hy affidavit, or as
otherwise provided in Rule 56, U.R.C.P., showing a genuine issue on any material fact.
The trial court's granting summary judgment in
favor of defendants, no cause of aetion, should there-

39
fore be affirmed and defendants should be awarded
their costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW
& CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendants

701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

